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Formal metrics for monitoring the quality and safety of healthcare have a valuable role, but may not, by
themselves, yield full insight into the range of fallibilities in organizations. ‘Soft intelligence’ is usefully
understood as the processes and behaviours associated with seeking and interpreting soft datadof the
kind that evade easy capture, straightforward classification and simple quantificationdto produce forms
of knowledge that can provide the basis for intervention. With the aim of examining current and po-
tential practice in relation to soft intelligence, we conducted and analysed 107 in-depth qualitative in-
terviews with senior leaders, including managers and clinicians, involved in healthcare quality and safety
in the English National Health Service. We found that participants were in little doubt about the value of
softer forms of data, especially for their role in revealing troubling issues that might be obscured by
conventional metrics. Their struggles lay in how to access softer data and turn them into a useful form of
knowing. Some of the dominant approaches they used risked replicating the limitations of hard,
quantitative data. They relied on processes of aggregation and triangulation that prioritised reliability, or
on instrumental use of soft data to animate the metrics. The unpredictable, untameable, spontaneous
quality of soft data could be lost in efforts to systematize their collection and interpretation to render
them more tractable. A more challenging but potentially rewarding approach involved processes and
behaviours aimed at disrupting taken-for-granted assumptions about quality, safety, and organizational
performance. This approach, which explicitly values the seeking out and the hearing of multiple voices, is
consistent with conceptual frameworks of organizational sensemaking and dialogical understandings of
knowledge. Using soft intelligence this way can be challenging and discomfiting, but may offer a critical
defence against the complacency that can precede crisis.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Egregious instances of healthcare system failure have occurred
globally. They often reach public attention through an event
involving a single patientdsuch as the death of Mary McClinton at
the Virginia Mason Medical Centre in Seattle, USA (Kaplan and
Patterson, 2008)dor sometimes through a catastrophe affecting
many, such as the scandal of incompetent surgery at the Bundaberg
Hospital in Australia (Van der Weyden, 2005). These kinds of
healthcare crisis tend to share structural characteristics with other
catastrophic events in demonstrating an unchecked drift intoPHIRE Group, Department of
LE1 6TP, United Kingdom.
r Ltd. This is an open access articlefailure (Dekker, 2012). Disastrous incidents are characteristically
preceded by an incubation period during which accumulating
latent conditions and warning signs are ignored or misinterpreted
due to habit and routine, where false assumptions and misplaced
optimism predominate, and where attempted remedial action is
misdirected (Macrae, 2014; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). Partial or
inaccurate information is often a crucial characteristic of the in-
cubation period, but it is compounded by poor intelligencedthe
failure to seek out relevant data or interpret the available data
properly. Cultures of denial, secrecy and protectionism, and frag-
mentation of knowledge about problems and responsibility for
addressing them, are often implicated in such failures (Turner and
Pidgeon, 1997).
Graphic, and tragic, illustrations of this pattern in healthcare
include the recent cases in England of the Morecambe Bay mater-
nity unit and Stafford Hospital. At Morecambe Bay, where poor careunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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dependent panel identified a “repeated failure to examine adverse
events properly” (Kirkup, 2015, p.183). “High-level metrics,” the
report added, “may not be sensitive to the underlying risks. For that
reason, it is important to understand what is happening in clinical
services themselves” (Kirkup, 2015, p.51). At Stafford, a public in-
quiry showed that systems of regulation and oversight failed to
identify and remedy problems of quality and safety over a long
period, linked to a preference among hospital leaders for infor-
mation that appeared to reflect well upon the organization and a
corresponding tendency to discount discomfiting data. “Statistics
and reports were preferred to patient experience data,” the inquiry
found (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry,
2013, p.13). To prevent future similar tragedies, the inquiry rec-
ommended that hospitals take greater heed of the insights of staff,
patients and carers, through “greater attention [… ] to the narrative
contained in, for instance, complaints data, as well as to the
numbers” (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry,
2013, p.90).
Subsequent efforts to identify and address problems of quality
and safety of care in England have counselled an emphasis on
‘problem-sensing’ rather than ‘comfort-seeking’ approaches
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2014). Problem-sensing should be geared to-
wards detecting fallibilities in organizational systems and cultures
that might lead to disasters, creating the “chronic unease” (Fruhen
et al., 2015, p.969) thought to be important in assuring safety other
high-risk industries. Hard metrics (e.g. rates of infections and
complications) will continue to play an invaluable role in identi-
fying hazards and risks in healthcare organizations, perhaps
coupled with proactive risk detection tools. Yet as experiences at
Stafford, Morecambe Bay and elsewhere demonstrate, hard data,
valuable as they are, may not yield full insight into the range of
vulnerabilities and fallibilities in organizations.
One reason for this lies in the social practices that influence the
production of such data.What gets recorded and reported is not the
outcome of a neutral scientific process; rather, it reflects both the
raw material available to those doing the recording and the de-
cisions of official authorities about the classification of that material
(cf. Bloor, 1991). Acts of recording and determination themselves
take place in organizational contexts where actors are attentive to
the possible uses to which data may be put (Kitsuse and Cicourel,
1963; Dixon-Woods et al., 2012), such that official records may
provide a distorted picture or diminish important particularities of
context. Official sources of knowledge on quality and safety, such as
routine statistics and incident-reporting systems, are susceptible to
such limitations (see, e.g., Currie et al., 2008; Waring, 2009).
Accordingly, there is often a disjuncture between what is known
informally and what reaches the status of official knowledge
(Waring and Bishop, 2010). But this is not just amatter of a failure of
communication: for some, there is a fundamental ontological dif-
ference between local knowledge (narrative, explanatory, and
particular) and managerial knowledge (quantitative, predictive,
and generalizing) that means that the former is not readily
amenable to conversion into the latter (Hill, 2004; Yanow, 2004).
The ability to anticipate disaster is also stymied by the frailties of
human cognition, as mediated by institutional context. Theorists of
‘sensemaking’ have shown how individuals' conceptualizations of
organizations are permeated by shared understandings developed
through communication with others (Weick et al., 2005). These
sensemaking frames enable co-ordinated action within organiza-
tions (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001), but can also blind managers
to alternative understandings, resulting in collective myopia that
can have disastrous results (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003). How these
frames might be disrupted is therefore of critical interest to those
seeking to detect hazards and anticipate and avert problems.Accordingly, calls for greater use of ‘soft intelligence’ deriving
from sources beyond conventional metrics and formal knowledge-
sharing systems have been made by academic and policy com-
mentators alike (Dixon-Woods et al., 2014; Exworthy, 2010;
Goddard et al., 1999; Millar et al., 2013). As Don Berwick and col-
leagues put it in a report commissioned by the British government
in the aftermath of Stafford, “leaders need first-hand knowledge of
the reality of the system at the front line, and they need to learn
directly from and remain connected with those for whom they are
responsible” (National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in
England, 2013, p.15).
Yet how these calls for soft intelligence might be answered, and
what challenges might lie in the way, remain little studied. A first
step is to gain some conceptual purchase on terms that are often
used interchangeably or treated as self-evident. In this regard, a
useful (if somewhat heuristic) distinction can be made between
data, knowledge or knowing, and intelligence. We propose that
data represent the raw material of knowing, but need to be iden-
tified, selected, processed, interpreted, and made the basis of ac-
tion. This implies, in Dretske's (1981) terms, a ‘knower’ capable of
recognising the significance of soft data, of judging their impor-
tance and identifying those elements that may be especially valu-
able in revealing risks, and of using them to guide action. The
knower (which may be an organizational entity rather than an
individual) is likely to require social capacities (including an
acceptance of the need to seek out discomfiting data) as well as
cognitive capacities (including the ability to interpret, synthesise
and judge). The knowledge generated must then be assessed for its
ability to guide action. ‘Soft intelligence’, for our purposes, refers
not to any discrete or prior entity, but to the processes and behav-
iours associated with seeking and identifying soft data on the part
of this individual or organizational actor, and with the knowledge-
producing activities of collation, synthesis, interpretation and
application of insights.
In this article, we draw on evidence from a large interview-
based study of senior stakeholders involved in quality and safety
in the English National Health Service (NHS) with the aim of
examining current and potential practice in relation to soft
intelligence.
2. Methods
We conducted interviews with senior leaders and influencers as
one element of a larger mixed-method research project on culture
and behaviour in the English NHS (Dixon-Woods et al., 2014).
Interview participants were purposively sampled from public
sources and through extensive snowball sampling, and selected for
their close involvement in quality and safety. They included NHS
leaders in acute hospitals (e.g. chief executives, medical and
nursing directors, executive and non-executive directors), senior
frontline staff (e.g. clinical directors, lead nurses), non-clinical
managers with roles in quality and safety (e.g. clinical governance
officers), and individuals in commissioning, regulatory, policy, and
academic organizations. In total,107 participants were interviewed,
including several with composite roles (Table 1). Interviews were
transcribed verbatim. Ethical approval was granted by an NHS
Research Ethics Committee (reference 10/H0406/38).
Our topic guide included questions about aspects of delivering
quality and safety improvement in healthcare, including what
participants understood the delivery of high-quality, safe care to
involve, what was required to make it happen, and what ap-
proaches to diagnosing and addressing problems they used. We
asked all participants about how they and others could know about
the state of quality and safety in their organizations. From this,
further discussion often flowed about the pros and cons of different
Table 1
Profile of participants.
Role Number %
Clinical manager 47 44
Manager 25 23
Clinician 15 14
Commentator (academic, thinktank, consultancy etc.) 13 12
Manager-commentator 4 4
Clinician-commentator 3 3
TOTAL 107 100
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problems, and the validity of different sources and how they could
be reconciled. Building on these discussions, we adapted our topic
guide to include a more explicit focus on use of sources of infor-
mation beyond formal metrics and incident-reporting systems,
which we operationalized by asking about “soft intelligence” and
“soft data”demic terms used spontaneously by some participants,
which had apparent face validity for others. Our interviews took
place between January and December 2011da period when the
public inquiry into Stafford hospital was never far from the news,
and when the issue of patient safety in the NHS in general was a
major focus of media interest.
GPM led the analysis for this paper, with an approach based on
Charmaz's (2006) constructivist grounded theory. He read and
reread transcripts, then identified all sections of interviews relating
to how knowledge of quality and safety is produced, and how po-
tential problems are identified. He undertook detailed coding of
these sections, applying open codes inductively. These related in
particular to the nature of the approaches described by partici-
pants, as well as their reported strengths and limitations. Next, he
reread the coded excerpts sequentially (to view similarly coded
data together instead of in the context of the original interviews),
and considered them in relation to the wider literature on knowl-
edge in organizations cited above. This process and discussionwith
colleagues led him to the sensemaking literature, and in light of this
he embarked on a round of axial coding that resulted (inter alia) in
the identification of three predominant approaches to soft intelli-
gence, detailed below. Further comparison across transcripts and
codes, alongside discussion among co-authors (who also had an
intimate knowledge of the transcripts) facilitated identification of
points of similarity and divergence between approaches, refine-
ment of categories, and theorization about the strengths and
weaknesses of different approaches. To the extent that it involved
iterative cycling between data and the existing literature, our
approach might be characterized as ‘abductive’ (Richardson and
Kramer, 2006): our developing understanding of the data was
informed by wider conceptual frameworks, particularly from
organizational sociology and psychology. However, we also
retained a strongly inductive logic throughout: for example, we
constructed our descriptions of the three predominant approaches
to soft intelligence through coding, comparing and recoding the
interview data. Thus we used theory, as Timmermans and Tavory
(2012, p.177) put it, “as a way to set up empirical puzzles” and
view the data through alternative lenses.
The large number of interviews, and the consistency of emer-
gent themes, gave us confidence in the relevance and validity of our
findings. While our analysis was undertaken after data collection
rather than alongside itdand so we cannot claim theoretical
saturation in Charmaz's (2006) sensedour rigorous approach to
coding, informed but not determined by the literature, and worked
on by several authors, helped to ensure robustness.3. Findings
Our findings are organized around three themes. First, we
describe participants' views on the potential role of soft data, and
their place in a system in which formal, quantitative metrics
dominate. Next, we discuss the challenges of making sense of soft
data. We describe three predominant approachesdwhich we label
‘Aggregation’, ‘Triangulation’, and ‘Instrumentalization’dused in
making soft data comprehensible and actionable. Finally, we note
some of the limitations of these approaches, and highlight some
alternative approaches, which, though challenging, hold promise.3.1. Soft intelligence: a crucial component of organizational
vigilance
Across our sample, participants emphasised the difficulties for
senior managers and leaders of forming an accurate picture of the
quality of care delivered at the sharp end of care. Conventional
approaches to trying tomaking the realities of the sharp end known
to the blunt end of organizations (executives and board members)
were sometimes slow and cumbersome, and prone to distort or
diminish potential hazards.
“What's actually happening day-to-day at ward level tends to be
very invisible traditionally, remarkably so.”
(Chief Executive)
Participants acknowledged these challenges explicitly, and
offered accounts of how they sought to overcome them. They
described multiple ways of collecting, collating and presenting
‘hard metrics’ using a range of different measuresdsuch as daily
statistics on process compliance, red-amber-green ratings, and
safety ‘dashboards’dand sometimes bringing measures together in
an attempt to gain more accurate and timely insights. At the same
time, however, participants recognized that well intentioned ef-
forts to expand metrics of quality could be counterproductive; in a
system already dominated by a multitude of measures, extra ones
could add to the noise without amplifying the signal:
“It's almost a norm in the NHS: a problem comes along and our
solution is to invent something tomeasure it andmonitor it, and we
don't say, ‘Right, what will we stop doing so we can do this?’ We
say, ‘Here's another thing to do’, and we add it on, and then we add
something else on, so there's no prioritizing or looking to see how
can we amalgamate this with this.”
(Associate Director of Nursing)
“I love dashboards. I think they are great tools, but I am a bit
concerned at the moment that the dashboards are getting so big,
because we are trying to measure so many things that something is
going to get lost in them.”
(Deputy Director, Infection Prevention and Control)
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of a different kind. Though sometimes only upon specific prompt-
ing, many were agreed that soft data offered a critical counterpoint
to the hard metrics yielded by audits, surveys and performance
monitoring, and incident-reporting systems.
“We do have areas that we have got shared understanding that we
might have a concern about, so at the moment it would be like, we
have had some problems in [operating] theatres, there is a problem
on a certain ward. We are getting a sense: we have had a few
different people mention problems in this area, so that's when we
will [have] different people go and drop in with the shirt on and do
the talking and try and get some softer data to see whether or not,
what we are hearing or what the hard data is telling us, actually
bears out in reality.”
(Non-executive Director)
“I think there's no substitute for those responsible for quality and
safety to actually go around, talk to and make notes of those talks,
with both patients and staff. Because that's the only way you find
out about things.”
(Medical Director)
Participants found that soft data offered rich, detailed, specific
and highly pertinent insights into real or potential problems in
quality of care, and in at least some organizations, these insights
were taken seriously at senior levels:
“People raise issues in all sorts of ways. I regularly get emails from
all sorts of staff, saying, ‘I am concerned about this’, or, ‘Do you
know about that?’”
(Chief Executive)
“I do it unofficially a lot, I bob about a lot and I have to goWard B14
in a bit to pick something up and I try, if I'm there, to speak to the
ward sister to pick something up, to speak to say three other people,
whether it's the housekeeper, a nurse, and walk about. I say, ‘Good
morning’, I say, ‘How are you doing today?’, I say ‘Are there any
problems today, is there anything that's happened?’”
(Patient Safety Manager)
Yet as we discuss next, while acknowledging the potential of
such data, participants were also very conscious of their limi-
tationsdand this in turn had important consequences for how they
did and did not use them.3.2. Making data intelligible?
The richness of soft data was not in doubt. But if participants
were conscious of the limitations of hard, quantitative data for
monitoring quality and safety, then soft data were even more
problematic. Participants' concerns related to the reliability, val-
idity and evidential standing of the insights available from soft data.
Issues raised spontaneously during ward visits might be matters of
serious import or might equally be one-off ‘blips’, atypical of usual
patterns of care. The issues raised might, participants suggested,
owe more to the perceptions, motives or disposition of the indi-
vidual raising them than to substantive risks to patient safety and
care quality: a huge concern for one individual might turn out to be
something trivialdor vice versa. Validation posed a major chal-
lenge: it was often very difficult for senior managers to distinguish
the normal ‘moans and gripes’ of employees from serious concerns.
With managerial time, energy and attention a scarce resource,identifying what needed action was crucial:
“When I look at my soft intelligence where I might have one
clinician that is telling me and moaning and groaning about an
organization, it might be a one-off and one particular case and it
could be that it is fact and widespread, so there is a judgment call.”
(Chief Nurse)
To a degree, participants felt that staff could be relied upon to
filter what they communicated based on their clinical knowledge
and experience of expected standards of care. Patients and carers,
on the other hand, were often seen to lack such a means of cali-
brating their concerns, and accordingly the pertinence and reli-
ability of the insights they provided were seen as particularly
variable. A recurrent concernwas that patients and carers might be
inclined to tolerate care that was in fact of poor quality.
“[Patients] have got no benchmark to work to, so they have no idea
of what quality the service should or shouldn't be, so they can't
actually ascertain whether they're receiving a good or bad service.”
(Improvement Consultant)
“On the ward we were on for the elderly, two-thirds of them have
got a degree of dementia: well they are not going to complain, are
they? There is no way, so you really are reliant on their relatives
and carers to raise concerns on their behalf, or staff. But I have to
say, the staff, it is quite interesting because when you go on these
visits, they will tell you how it is.”
(Assistant Director of Quality)
In general, participants were clear that insights from the sharp
end could not all be taken at face value: rather, active interpretive
work was required to assess the validity, scope and importance of
soft data, to make them intelligible, and to give them instrumental
utility. Consistent with our construction of soft intelligence as a set
of processes and behaviours, participants were clear that simply
accessing soft data was not enough. They recognized the need to
turn data into intelligence: to instil them with meaning, decouple
them from the specifics of their production, and make them
consequential as a tool for assessing the state of quality and safety.
Participants described these processes and behaviours in
some detail, leading us to distinguish between three broad ap-
proaches to creating intelligence: ‘Aggregation’, ‘Triangulation’ and
‘Instrumentalization’.
1. Aggregation. When participants received a high volume of
similar reports from multiple sources, they tended to conclude
that the issue was more than a one-off incident or the idio-
syncratic view of an individual complainant, that problemswere
real and persistent, and that they were worthy of investigation.
Aggregation of this kind was therefore an important tool to
distinguish data that merited action from those which could be
safely sequestered:
“I think that would have to be about patterns and trends: if you
hear the same things coming up again and again.”
(Patient Safety Manager)
“I think patient stories are well underused personally. I think they
are very powerful. [We] collate them and then the services will look
at them and say, ‘Well we have got 10 patient stories and these are
the key areas’, because you can't look at every single patient story
and say that patient said that and that. So pulling out the key
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these?’”
(Quality and Patient Safety Manager)
2. Triangulation. Second, participants often described using soft
data in tandem with harder metrics, using one to validate the
other. Soft data could prompt greater interrogation of quanti-
tative data to identify temporal trends and cross-unit differ-
ences, or add nuance or richness to the scene drawn by
quantitative data. Though participants placed greater confi-
dence in the overall picture presented by the quantitative data,
they reported that soft data could aid interpretation of the
metrics, or suggest areas where better quantitative data
collectionwas needed. But in this mode, the role of soft datawas
generally subordinate rather than having standing in its own
right.
“The way to distinguish is to do a bit of an attempt at triangulation,
so if something is being suggested as being a problem, to actually
look very hard to try and find the evidence that would support that.
So if someone was complaining about poor levels of cleanliness, to
actually look at infection rates for example or perhaps do a patient
survey, do an audit and get patients' views [ … ] about what they
feel about the cleanliness.”
(Head of Patient Safety)
“On the staff side of thing, as I said, the softer data really comes
through again, the staff survey feedback twice a year, staff stories
which we individually collect, and our visibility and assurances
that we conduct with the board. [… ] Again that's referred to in the
board paper so you can go through that and the reports on that. So
lots of soft intelligence to back up hard data”
(Nonexecutive Director)
3. Instrumentalization. Finally, participants often described quite a
different approach to utilizing data from patients and carers
specifically, which, as noted above, they tended to see as poorly
calibrated. Participants felt that the particular value of such data
might lie less in diagnosis of problems relating to quality of care
than in their ability to add emotional force to an argument
premised on quantitative data, and thereby persuade others of
the need for improvement. Soft data, in this mode, were
mobilized instrumentally, as a ‘technology of persuasion’
(Armstrong et al., 2013).
[Interviewer: Do you use soft measures as well as the hard data?]
“Not as much as we should. So for example at the clinical effec-
tiveness meeting where all our clinical directors meet once a
month, our medical director told a striking patient story where
harm resulted from the lack of a discharge letter, and it was
effective and we should do much more of it than we do.”
(Associate Director, Quality Improvement)
“Engaging our senior leaders with a combination of data and pa-
tients' stories, walking them round, seeing the system issues around
us. [… ] I got our director of finance onto ourwards and showed him
the data, demonstrating numerically, and then stood at the end of
some patients' beds and said, ‘Although I can show you the numbers
that show we keep somebody in hospital this much longer than
average compared to England, this is actually what it means to this
patient today sitting in front of you’. And there were some magic
moments there … when he turned to me and said, ‘These numbers
come across my desk, but actually now I see what it means’.”
(Clinical Lead for Quality Improvement)Through these three translational mechanisms, participants
described how they made soft data meaningful, and thus endowed
them with function in relation to quality and safety, either diag-
nostically (Aggregation and Triangulation) or illustratively and
persuasively (Instrumentalization). The three approaches to
generating soft intelligence were not mutually exclusive, and two
or more were often present in participants' accounts, with overlap
evident between our categories of Aggregation and Triangulation.
However, there were also important distinctions between the two:
whereas Aggregation implied that soft data could become useful
independently, through the accumulation of multiple soft data,
Triangulation saw generating soft intelligence only as a comple-
ment to or means of validating data derived from conventional
sources.3.3. Beyond quantification and instrumentalization: valuing soft
intelligence
Some participants also recognized, though, that in these pro-
cesses of translation, something of the intrinsic value of softer
forms of data might be lostdperhaps reproducing the inadequacies
of formal metrics. If, for example, managers relied on Aggregation
to isolate the most salient information offered by sources of soft
intelligence, they risked disregarding important insights. This
quantification of qualitative insights meant ascribing greater value
to the views of the many rather than of the few, and risked
neglecting the dissenting, but potentially valid, insights of those
who demurred from the general view. Such views could, of course,
be most important in exactly the situations where risks to quality
and safety were greatest, particularly where substandard care had
become normalized to the extent that staff were desensitized to
deficits in quality and safety.
“I went to visit my husband's aunt in hospital not long ago and the
basic care she was getting was OK, but I was appalled by the
approach of the nurses, the attitude of the nurses, absolutely hor-
rified. And when I went to PALS [Patient Advice and Liaison Serv-
icedintermediary body providing advice and advocacy to
patients], I said, ‘I am not making a complaint’, but there was so
many alarm bells that I couldn't actually pinpoint and so I had to be
general. PALS were quite defensive and I just thought: it is almost
when you work in that environment, it becomes the norm, doesn't
it, and whistle-blowing is not an issue because you don't even see a
reason to whistle-blow.”
(Clinical Governance and Quality Facilitator)
Such situations put the difficulties of interpretation associated
with soft intelligence in a very different light. Rather than consti-
tuting an elusive, indeterminate resource whose diagnostic worth
could only be gauged through quantification, it became a critical
source of insight that other ways of knowing could not reveal, and
which could not be reduced to metrics.
In this light, the idiosyncratic, uncalibrated views of patients or
their carers became instead a fresh and untainted source of insight,
not simplydas in Instrumentalizationda way of adding colour and
human interest to dry numbers. Similarly, the implication of Tri-
angulationdthat soft data could be expected to ‘line up’ with
harder metrics, providing a useful but epistemically subordinate
complement to statisticsdwas also limiting. Taken together,
exclusive reliance on these modes of translating data into soft in-
telligence risked painting a falsely reassuring picture. While Ag-
gregation, Triangulation and Instrumentalization were useful
means of deriving meaning from soft data, there was some
G.P. Martin et al. / Social Science & Medicine 142 (2015) 19e2624recognition that reliance on such approaches alone risked over-
looking their greatest potential value.
How, then, to apprehend and make use of this value? How to
process such a detailed, frustrating, rich, and irreducibly complex
resource? For some participants, the answer lay in improving the
early parts of the process of generating soft intelligence, prior to
interpretationdin what we label a greater ‘Systematization’ of
processes. Rather than relying on concerns raised by staff, patients
and carers themselves, they sought to generate mechanisms for
soliciting these insights proactively, to eliminate the inconsistency
associated with reliance on the decisions of self-selecting in-
dividuals to speak up on self-identified issues. Approaches included
censuses of all patients at the point of discharge, and random
sampling of staff or patients to obtain insights on topics of known
importance to quality and safety:
“One of the top hotels, [ … ] they invite on a random basis, people
back to talk to the top team. We've mirrored that, by randomly
selecting people who are in outpatient community services to meet
with two execs to tell us what it was like, both good and bad. [… ]
Of all the random people we've invited, they've all come.”
(Chief Nurse)
“We have exit cards, so as they are about to go, they can complete
an exit card which asks them, ‘What was the best thing about your
stay? What is the one thing we could do better?’ What we are
hoping to introduce, but have not done yet, is a card that could be
used throughout their stay that just says, ‘What is the best thing
that happened to you today?’, and, ‘What is the one thing that
would have made your experience today better?”
(Head of Nursing)
Such approaches sought to address some of the problems
associated with gathering soft data. Random selection and census-
based approaches could avoid the bias inherent in self-selection;
solicitation could give voice to patients and carers who might
otherwise remain silent; and up-front identification of topics of
interest could give focus to soft data, while avoiding the generation
of perceived irrelevancies. Systematizing approaches like this could
‘tame’ soft data at the point of collection, making them less idio-
graphic and minimizing the risk of bias so that data were more
readily useful:
“I think there is a great resistance here to look at those, to look at
gossip. It has to be returned, how shall we say? The views have to be
in a controlled manner, within a controlled system.”
(Chair of Board)
However, there was also a sense that this process too could
transform the character of soft data. If part of their value lay in the
way it could expose the unknown and unanticipated, then struc-
turing soft data at the point of collection through Systematization
to render them more tractable risked losing that value altogether.
‘Tame’ soft data offered a helpful way of obtaining a comprehensive
and systematic picture of quality of care, but a better way of
apprehending soft data ‘in the wild’din all their context-laden,
particular richnessdwas also needed.
Our interviews offered some intriguing indications of how this
might be achieved. These involved finding novel ways of facilitating
the generation and transmission of soft intelligence by encouraging
staff, patients and carers to speak out about quality and safety,
without structuring how they did it. These approaches, varied as
they were, all hinted at the possibility of valuing soft intelligencefor its untamed richness. They involved interpretation through
dialogue, so that soft datawere treated not as a static resource to be
aggregated, triangulated or instrumentalized, but something more
dynamic, whose value was better found in a joint process of
meaning-making.
“Some of our services have patient forums, up in our elderly care
unit they have [ … ] listening clinics where the matrons actually
invite patients or their relatives to come in and talk to them about
their experiences and any issues, and the services, and what went
well and what didn't go well, and that's a really good initiative up
there.”
(Lead Nurse, Infection Prevention)
“We had an open day recently, which I though was really quite
positive. And service users came in for a Saturday. [ … ] Our chief
exec went out to a group of patient representatives and got feed-
back from the patients that had been in and out and said, ‘Look,
what would you change?What went wrong? What do you want us
to do?’ And that's been acted on.”
(Nurse Specialist)
“Our own local services will run user and carer fora. We have staff
fora where they can give their views, and we seek those views. [… ]
We have instituted these conversations with our user groups and
some of them have them quite regularly sort of weekly, formal
meetings with people on the ward, et cetera, to say, you know,
‘What do you expect of us?’ And they will tell us in no uncertain
terms, that the food isn't right, or the environment isn't right,
people are rudedor they are very good, conversely!”
(Non-executive Director)
Such approaches were labour-intensive and time-consuming.
The insights they produced were not predictable or replicable.
But in them, there seemed promise of a way of generating soft
intelligence without taming its unpredictable richness.
4. Discussion
Our analysis suggests widespread agreement about the impor-
tance of soft intelligence among senior leaders of health systems in
England, but much less consensus about how best to harvest value
from soft data deriving from staff, patients, and carers. Participants
in our study were not naïve about the limitations of relying solely
on formal metrics to characterize the state of quality and safety at
the sharp end of care. Rather, their struggles lay in how to access
softer data and turn them into a useful form of knowing. Some of
the most prominent strategies they useddthose we label Aggre-
gation (looking for accumulations of evidence) and Triangulation
(synthesising various forms of evidence)dconstituted interpretive
filters that made it possible to identify potentially significant pat-
terns. These approaches undoubtedly had utility, but they also
risked reproducing some of the disadvantages of formal metrics:
they meant that repeated and widely held views were given much
greater credence than the exceptional views expressed by the few.
Reliability of insights across multiple individuals was thus equated
with validity, potentially neglecting rarely articulated but important
insights. In consequence, serious problems with the quality of care
might be missed: the broad-brush, aggregate picture produced by
summary statistics might be reproduced, not corrected, by softer
intelligence. An unchecked drift into failure (Dekker, 2012) might
therefore occur not necessarily through failure to seek out soft data
(though that may happen too), but rather because of defects in the
processes and behaviours involved in generating soft intelligence.
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we found recall the cognitive limitations identified in the sense-
making literature as potential barriers to pre-emptive identification
of imminent disaster (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003;Weick et al., 2005).
Sensemaking serves an important function in organization: it is a
means of reducing the uncertainty, ambiguity, and cognitive
dissonance caused by an abundance of conflicting data and a
multiplicity of possible explanations (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012).
But sensemaking is “not about truth and getting it right. Instead, it
is about continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it be-
comes more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed
data, and is more resilient in the face of criticism” (Weick et al.,
2005, p.415). Thus, while it may be highly functional in facili-
tating organizational processes in times of (apparent) normality, it
can hinder free thinking and challenge. Reliance on Aggregation
and Triangulation risks reinforcing a bias towards congruity and
consensus, and resistance towards challenge and disruption. By
seeking to strip soft data of their contextual specificity and translate
them into more broadly applicable knowledge, these approaches
give precedence to commonsense views that are plausible and
broadly acceptable, over the difficult, counterintuitive, foreigndbut
potentially very usefuldinsights presented by a few iconoclasts.
Systematization of data collection, similarly, might tend to
emphasise the views of a majority whose organizational accultur-
ation may also result in partiality. As such, these dominant ap-
proaches to soft intelligence risk reinforcing rather than
confronting the potentially flawed understandings reached
through reliance on conventional metrics and formal knowledge-
management systems.
We do not argue that there is no place for such approaches: this
kind of knowledge undoubtedly offers an important barometer of
the overall state of an organization, and converting data into this
kind of knowledge is a legitimate endeavour. However, soft data
can also produce a different kind of knowledge, and relying solely
on Aggregation, Triangulation and Systematization will not reap
what is perhaps the most valuable potential element of the gen-
eration of soft intelligence: the alternative perspectives that pro-
vide a way to “challenge easy explanations” (Weick and Sutcliffe,
2003, p.82) offered by shared sensemaking framesdand thereby
avoid the kind of narrowing of vision that may ultimately be
implicated in disaster. Patients' and carers' viewsdprone to being
relegated to illustrative use through Instrumentalization rather
than recognized for their diagnostic utilitydare arguably of
particular value in this regard, since patients are not inculcated into
the same sensemaking community. The samemight be said of more
junior clinicians, particularly those rotating between organizations
(Keogh, 2013).
Generating this kind of soft intelligence, however, and avoiding
reduction to common sensemaking frames, is far from easy. The
unpredictable, untameable, spontaneous quality of soft data is
what gave them their value, but it could be lost in efforts to sys-
tematize their collection and make them more tractable. Thus just
as formal knowledge-management systems can corrupt or distort
what is shared and becomes ‘official knowledge’ (Waring and
Bishop, 2010), so too can efforts to make use of soft intelligence.
For some, the very act of generating soft intelligencedcollecting,
interpreting and making use of soft datadis self-defeating. Hill
(2004, p.227) describes the conversion of soft data into manageri-
ally useful knowledge as a process of “bring[ing] local knowledge in
line,” so that it is “appropriated, redefined, and reformulated, [… ]
imbuing it with dominant meaning,” thus, in our terms, thwarting
the processes and behaviours needed to generate soft intelligence
that produces the greatest yield in improving safety and quality.
Hill suggests that any effort to use soft data towards managerial
objectives is doomed to failure, since it will inevitably obscure therichness of specific meaning with dominant sensemaking frames.
Put this way, it is not the mediation of knowledge through formal
knowledge-management systems that corrupts (cf. Currie et al.,
2008), but the very desire to make managerial use of soft data.
We are not so pessimistic about the potential for soft intelli-
gence. However, escaping Hill's negative prognosis requires a
different approach to soft intelligence from those of Aggregation,
Triangulation, Instrumentalization and Systematization. In plotting
this escape, Schultze and Stabell's (2004) critique of knowledge
management is helpful. Their analysis highlights the limitations of
conventional approaches to knowledge management in organiza-
tions, which tend to characterize knowledge as an objective entity
that can be separated unproblematically from the knower. Conse-
quently, such approaches conceptualize knowledge management
as an unproblematic process of accumulating more and more
‘pieces’ of knowledge with a view to “ultimate perfection and
omniscience” (Schultze and Stabell, 2004, p.556)din the manner of
Aggregationdor reconciling knowledge from different perspec-
tives within “systems of distributed cognition” (Schultze and
Stabell, 2004, p.557) so that a progressively richer and more com-
plete picture can be builtdin the manner of Triangulation. Both
these approaches assume that a realistic picture of an organiza-
tional featuredsuch as quality and safetydcan be achieved, either
through the cumulative piecing together of fragments of knowl-
edge, or by reconciling different perspectives. However, deploying a
dialogical understanding of knowledge, Schultze and Stabell (2004)
demonstrate the flaws in such approaches. Consistent with Weick
et al.'s (2005) notion of sensemaking, a dialogical perspective
contends that knowledge is partial and inextricably tied up with
dominant ideas about what is and what should be. In this light,
argue Schultze and Stabell (2004, p.560), the particular benefit to
be gained from efforts to gather and manage knowledge is not
clarity, but disruption: “to create a space for multiple knowledges
and marginalized voices [ … ] and to deconstruct self-evident
concepts.”
Schultze and Stabell do not argue for a rejection of the benefits
that can be derived from conventional approaches to knowledge
management, as reflected in our constructs of Aggregation and
Triangulation, but they do suggest the particular benefits to be
derived from a dialogical approach. In our study we found glimpses
of what such an approach might look like in healthcare, in the form
of efforts to gather intelligence ‘in the wild’, untamed by System-
atization, such as the forums for unstructured encounters between
managers, patients and sharp-end staff described in the final three
interview excerpts above. Others, too, have put forward helpfully
practical suggestions about knowledge elicitation that offer clues
about how a dialogical approach might be realized. Gavrilova and
Andreeva (2012, pp.529e530), for example, discuss the particular
merits of more ‘passive’ approaches to accessing intelligence that
can give rise to “serendipitous revelation of pieces of tacit knowl-
edge,” instead of reproducing the “already verbalized, formalized
knowledge” that Systematization is likely to access. Again, this does
not mean that there is no place for Systematization, but it does
mean a place for the spontaneous soft data that can arise from
chance encounters and unprompted discussions. Ideas like these
hint at how managerial utility might be derived from soft intelli-
gence in a way that values its multi-vocal richness, rather than
contorting it to fit into conventional managerial frames. They also
point to how soft intelligence may usefully be oriented towards
more positive aspects of organizational functioning. Though a focus
on latent troubles is valuable, relentless attention to the negative
may not be productive.
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The implications of our analysis are not easy. Deriving optimal
benefit from soft intelligence requires more than simply accessing
soft data; indeed, the ‘knowing’ produced through accessing such
data may even be misleading, particularly if soft data are treated
through the same interpretive frames as hard data. What matters is
valuing soft data not only for their differences of scope and detail,
but also when they offer dissent rather than confirmation. In
particular, this means that while there is undoubtedly a place for
the approaches to soft intelligence described most frequently by
our participants, this needs to be leavened by an awareness that the
overall pictures produced by these approaches can hide as much as
they reveal. Where soft intelligence challenges the dominant pic-
ture, this should be valued as an opportunity rather than dismissed
as an anomaly. As Macrae (2014, p.442) has it, “any fleeting un-
certainties or doubts regarding patient safetydor current un-
derstandings of itdneed to be seized upon and ruthlessly
explored.” This aligns with the sense of ‘chronic unease’ said to
characterize high-reliability organizations, where vigilance, pro-
pensity to worry, imagination, flexible thinking and even pessi-
mism are seen as crucial components of an ability to anticipate
problems (Fruhen et al., 2015). Used intelligently and sensitively,
soft intelligence will be discomfiting and disruptive; often it will
introduce greater doubt rather than greater certainty. But taking
the challenge presented by soft intelligence seriously may equip
healthcare managers with some of the tools they need to overcome
predisposition towards the security provided by the superficial
plausibility of dominant sensemaking framesdand perhaps
thereby help them to evade the false reassurance that, as past ex-
periences show, can breed complacency, ignorance, and undetected
calamity.
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